That secret letter that sparked HTS’ transformation

Year 2015. Syria's de-facto leader al-Jolani receives a letter of directives. The final point reads: Do not attack the West.

Caption from a recent interview Al Jolani gave to US broadcaster PBS.

We are now in the phase of getting to know Syria’s new de facto leader Ahmad al-Sharra—formerly al-Jolani—and his jihadist organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Have they moderated? Western media keeps asking, hoping the answer is yes.

But what does "moderation" mean for a jihadist group? Do we even know what the concept entails within the jihadist paradigm—or, to be frank, in any paradigm?

Most political scientists lean on the inclusion-moderation framework as an analytical tool. I don’t. To use it effectively, one must define "moderation" so comprehensively that the concept becomes cumbersome. The framework posits that an open road to electoral participation encourages extremist ideas to moderate. In other words, inclusion within the system leads to an intuitive shedding of radical positions.

Here’s the problem: moderation often gets conflated with democratic practices, which muddies the waters. If the system itself isn’t democratic, compliance with it might signify moderation, but it certainly doesn’t indicate democratization. For these and other reasons (spare me the methodology debates), I didn’t use this hypothesis in my book The New Spirit of Islamism to analyze the aspirations and goals of two of the oldest Islamist movements in the world—the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia—after the Arab Uprisings. Especially when studying their interactions with Turkey’s AKP. Instead, I argue that process tracing better captures transformations in a movement’s action plans, goals, and, eventually, the morphology of its ideology.

In the coming weeks, I’ll share my findings about Ikhwan, Ennahda, and the AKP to highlight two key dynamics:

1. How the AKP “helped” or “mentored” Ikhwan and Ennahda after Mubarak and Ben Ali were ousted.

2. How Islamist entities like Ikhwan and Ennahda react to shifts in opportunity structures.

With this, perhaps we can sketch how the AKP’s toolbox—yes, they have a toolbox—might influence HTS in Syria. That said, HTS is a very different organization than Ikhwan or Ennahda, and the AKP of 2024 is far more cautious and experienced than the AKP of 2011.

But let’s focus on one critical event in HTS’s transformation. Let’s loosely process-trace.

Al-Zawahiri with Bin Laden in 2001. GETTY IMAGES. Src: Foreign Policy

It’s early 2015. Abu al-Jolani, then leader of the now-defunct Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN)—still affiliated with al-Qaeda—receives a secret letter. The sender? Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaeda leader and the U.S.’s most-wanted man after Bin Laden.

The letter included directives:

• Better integrate your movement within the Syrian revolution and its people.

• Coordinate more closely with other Islamic groups on the ground.

• Contribute to the establishment of a Syria-wide Sharia judicial court system.

• Use strategic areas of the country to build a sustainable al-Qaeda power base.

• Cease using Syria as a base for attacks on the West.¹

Complying with these directives—particularly the last one, ceasing attacks on the West—wasn’t immediate for Jolani. In his first face-to-face interview with Al Jazeera’s Arabic channel on May 27, 2015, he clarified, “Our mission in Syria is ensuring the downfall of the regime, its symbols, and its allies like Hezbollah.” However, he also warned that if the group continued to be targeted by the U.S., “all options are open—anyone has the right to self-defense.”²

For a movement like JaN, rooted in jihadism’s inherently transnational perspective, Zawahiri’s directives marked a major shift. Jolani needed time to persuade his ranks to abandon attacks on the West, a move that led to defections and internal strife. Over the years, JaN fought those splinter groups, severed ties with al-Qaeda, weakened ISIS, and rebranded itself as HTS—a third-wave jihadist actor. In social movement parlance, this transformation is called “downward scale-shift,” meaning a localized—narrowed—focus.

What’s striking is that this pragmatic shift was first proposed by al-Qaeda itself. Surprising, isn’t it?

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What of Alawites and non-Muslims?

It is clear that Ahmad al-Sharra wants to rule Syria. I argue that he will do whatever it takes to "legitimize" himself as a capable political actor. This is the essence of the new spirit of Islamism. Neither he nor his movement will ever become a liberal democratic agent, but he will craft a public image palatable to Western countries while projecting a domesticated version of Islamism that avoids irritating Gulf nations. His timid reaction to Israel’s land grab and offensive in the Golan Heights is a telling indicator.

However, we should not overlook the fact that his political and military rule in Idlib has been deeply authoritarian, leaving no space for dissent. His understanding of democracy is limited to the classical Islamist interpretation of al-Shura—consultation. When he claims, he does not want to exclude anyone, he envisions setting up a Shura council and establishing Sharia courts.³

In the same interview I referenced earlier, we also gain insight into his stance on non-Muslims and Alawites. “If Alawites leave their religion and abandon Bashar al-Assad, we will protect them. Christians, meanwhile, could live in peace under a future non-conflict state ruled by Jabhat al-Nusra but would be required to pay the jizya tax in exchange for their protection.”⁴

This was al-Jolani in 2015. His current thirst for power is so consuming that I doubt he would insist on conditions like Alawites "leaving their religion" or imposing the jizya tax on non-Muslims today.

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A neo-Ottomanist or a neoliberal?

Illustration: HELLOVON Src: Wall Street Journal

The recent discussions about Turkey being the ultimate "winner" of the Syrian civil war have reignited debates about Erdoğan’s so-called neo-Ottoman ambitions. Yet, "neo-Ottomanism" is a convoluted term that muddles analysis rather than clarifying it. Which Ottoman era are we referring to? What exactly do we mean by neo-Ottomanism? The despotism of Abdulhamid II? The expansionism of Suleiman the Magnificent? Ottomanism in the sense of the millet system, before the empire attempted to transform itself into a modern state mould with the Tanzimat reforms? Which Sultan does Erdoğan align with?

The Neo-Ottomanist narrative has long existed within Turkish Islamist circles—it didn’t start with Erdoğan. Its roots trace back to Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the AKP’s predecessor, the Milli Görüş movement. This narrative primarily aimed to challenge the hegemonic secular, Kemalist, and republican discourse. After its second term in 2007, the AKP began positioning itself as a voice for the Muslim world, coinciding with Ahmet Davutoğlu’s tenure as foreign minister. Davutoğlu’s vision sought to restore Turkey’s influence in the region and the broader Muslim world.

Parallel to this was the commodification of Ottoman arts, architecture, and ceremonies. Events like the conquest of Istanbul became elaborate spectacles. This version of Ottomanism, however, is shallow, banal, and market-driven, failing to capture the complexity of the Ottoman era. It is also highly selective—celebrating glories while conveniently omitting failures, losses, and atrocities.

Critically, it leverages Ottoman symbols to construct connections where none exist, crafting a "New Turkey" centered on the AKP. This narrative’s primary purpose has been to consolidate domestic support rather than to guide foreign policy. And even domestically, it hasn’t been entirely successful—Atatürk and republicanism remain the dominant bond uniting the majority of society.

Turkey’s overtures toward Arab countries following the Arab Uprisings weren’t driven by a Neo-Ottoman agenda or an ambition to build a so-called Brotherhood bloc. The driving force wasn’t Islamist ideology. Erdoğan doesn’t want to rule Aleppo, if there is anyone was wondering. His real goal is to reinforce the identity narrative he has been crafting since 2007. The intended audience is domestic, not international. The aim is to consolidate his base around a triumphalist story.

At his core, Erdoğan is a pragmatic neoliberal. His primary ambition – his dream scenario - for Syria now is “reconstruction.” This ensures lucrative contracts for his clientelist network of construction companies, with Erdoğan personally benefiting as well. To achieve this, he would prefer a Syrian government he could influence (or manipulate), a Kurdish entity resembling Iraqi Kurdistan (severed from PKK ties, though this is unlikely), and a political tool to pressure Turkey’s Kurdish movement domestically.

But as you can see, the variables and contingencies here are dizzying.

1. Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) : 354.

2. Ibid: 353.

3. Ibid: 341.

4. Ibid: 354.