Islamism of Hamas - a futile attempt of fine-tuning

For those who seek easy classifications, the nuances I have listed may appear superfluous. However, for those genuinely invested in understanding the intricacies...

FOREIGN POLICY ILLUSTRATION/GETTY IMAGES

Hamas has garnered recognition for its involvement in acts of violence, armed conflict, and acts commonly categorized as terrorism, particularly within Israel. Nonetheless, it is a multifaceted organization with a complex ideology and organizational structure since its inception. Understanding Hamas requires the application of a diverse set of methodologies. As articulated by Hani Awad in his article¹, a comprehensive analysis involves tracking the morphological evolution of its Islamism and employing the tools and frameworks provided by social movement theory. This latter approach allows for a deeper exploration of the competition between Hamas and PLO/Fatah, a vital aspect in comprehending the developments that have shaped the organization's trajectory to its present state.

Hamas emerged in 1987 as the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and became a rival to Fatah. While it acknowledges its affiliation with the MB, Hamas's charter emphasizes its distinct Palestinian identity. In its early years, Hamas held the belief that Palestine is both Arab and Islamic, considering it to have fallen under colonial control after the decline of the Ottoman Empire. It viewed the establishment of Israel as a means of perpetuating colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and thus regarded it as illegitimate.

As Hamas expert Khaled Hroub argues that Hamas' Islamism is a reflection of the broader trend of the rise of Islamic movements in the Arab and Islamic world since the late 1970s. Similarly, many Palestinian resistance organizations in the 1960s and 1970s were influenced by international ideological trends in the Middle East. Therefore, Palestinian nationalist movements in the 20th century can be viewed in two ways: first, as resistance to occupation, and second, as expressions of the prevailing ideologies in the Middle East during their respective periods.²

From fedaiyeen to shuhada

The rise of Islamism in Palestinian territories – and elsewhere for that matter-, particularly during the 1980s has a backdrop: The decline of Arab nationalism after the 1967 War, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, negative effects of state-building, and increased inequality during the 1970s oil boom. Amid this complex context, the MB expanded its presence in the Palestinian territories with tacit approval from Israeli authorities. This approval stemmed from the belief that empowering local elites would be a more cost-effective approach than engaging in negotiations with the PLO leaders who were in exile at the time.³ This condonement allowed Islamist leaders to fill the political vacuum left by the weakening of PLO networks. Israel's plan to weaken the PLO by allowing Islamist organizations to operate had unintended consequences: The MB’s involvement meant connecting those within the Palestinian territories and those in the diaspora, fostering a generational shift away from the traditional leadership. This shift was driven by the urgent need for a different approach due to heightened competition between factions, the growing influence of Fatah, and the looming conflict with Israeli occupiers. The transition from missionary work to politics culminated in the hurried drafting of the Hamas Charter in August 1988 – surely an antisemitic and racist text. Soon, the fedaiyeen of the PLO’s would be replaced by shahids (martyrs - shuhada) of jihad.⁴

Hamas diverged from the PLO's approach of armed struggle to reclaim the occupied homeland, instead emphasizing the use of jihad as the sole solution to the Palestinian issue. Their goal was the complete liberation of historic Palestine, transforming it into an Islamic state.⁵ The explicit nature and outline of the Islamic Palestine that Hamas aims to form remains unclear in its charter. What would the political and theological structures be? There is no indication of a departure from the modern nation-state model either. In a similar vein, Hamas, as a descendant of the Muslim Brotherhood, values its transnational activism within its Islamist framework but consistently emphasizes its Palestinian identity. In essence, Hamas does not aspire to establish a caliphate, pan-Islamic entity, or holds a vision ofumma similar to that envisioned by the Al-Afghani school. However, it is fair to say that where PLO/Fatah was ‘was fundamentally statist and nationalist, grounded in the idea of the Palestinians' right to an independent and sovereign state, [...] Hamas, was in line with other contemporary Islamist movements.’⁶ That is why in Hamas’ charter PLO is accused of ‘embracing the secular state, an idea entirely contradictory to the religious idea, under the influence of the intellectualchaos ushered in by "intellectual invasion […] reinforced by Orientalism, [Western] missionaries and colonialism.’⁷

It is imperative to acknowledge that Hamas emerged from the Palestinian nationalist ethos, albeit with a pronounced Islamic infusion. Unlike the majority of Islamist movements that go through phases of nationalisation, it followed a reverse trajectory that is Islamization+Palestinianization of its foundational ideology. However, eventually, by anchoring its nationalism in Islamism, Hamas aligned its objectives with other Islamist parties that blend Islamic identity with nationalism. Two main tenets underscore Hamas: its hostility to Zionism and its antagonism towards the Fatah. Here, the social movement theory is helpful as it facilitates an understanding of how, over successive periods, Hamas leadership employed Islamist ‘frames’ to mobilize support and contest Fatah’s dominance over Palestinian historical narratives. Consequently, although Hamas held a dominant position in articulating the Palestinian cause, its Islamist paradigms and violence proved detrimental, leading to a diminution of support both domestically and on the global stage.Another important point in understanding Hamas’ rise is to consider, - on top of the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank- the dynamics within Israeli society. It can be argued that the Islamization of Palestinian identity is also a response to the emphasis placed by the Israeli elite on Jewish identity.⁸

Hamas = ISIS?

Many Palestinians felt a personal connection to Hamas due to its civic work and community engagement rather than its military and political manoeuvres. This may explain why Hamas, had been able to inspire high levels of volunteerism, even in the face of widespread poverty and economic decline. During the Oslo period, Hamas played a critical role in institution-building amid systemic oppression, both from external sources (Israel) and internal forces (the Palestinian National Authority). This contributed to their success and – eventually - failures. Notably, Islamic organizations, including the majority associated with Hamas, increasingly took on mediating roles in society, which had traditionally been the domain of secular political factions.⁹

All this is to emphasize that Islamist movements exhibit a spectrum of beliefs, objectives, and methodologies. They are not a monolithic entity. While there may be overarching similarities in certain aspects, the distinctions between groups such as Hamas, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda are pronounced and multifaceted. Succumbing to oversimplification and generalization can lead to misconceptions and misguided policy decisions. For those who seek easy, unwavering classifications, the nuances I have listed may appear superfluous. However, for those genuinely invested in understanding the intricacies, these distinctions are paramount. This piece is written for the latter audience.

1. Awad, Hani. “Understanding Hamas: Remarks on Three Different and Interrelated Theoretical Approaches.” AlMuntaqa 4, no. 2 (2022): 42–62.

2. Ḥarūb, Khālid. Hamas : Political Thought and Practice. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, pp.11-44.

3. Awad, Hani. “Understanding Hamas”, 46.

4. Ibid., 47, 51.

5. Baconi, Tareq. Hamas Contained : The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020, 24.

6. Awad, Hani. Understanding Hamas, 50.

7. Hamas Charter, July 2005. 

8. Baruch Kimmerling. Clash of Identities: Explorations in Israeli and Palestinian Societies. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

9. Roy, Sara M. Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza : Engaging the Islamist Social Sector. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.