The Issue of Abu Ivanka and Iran vs. Gulf States
How should we view the complex relationship—the push and pull, the reciprocal recrimination, the relentless race for narrative—between the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, and Iran?
Yes, they call him Abu Ivanka. Father of Ivanka. Ivanka Trump. That’s how commentators and policymakers in the Gulf States refer to the president-elect, Donald Trump. And while Europeans fret over the days ahead, Gulf States and Israel are quietly celebrating his return to power. Why? Because they've learned the art of transacting with a man who stands for no principle, lacks coherence, and displays no consistency. Once you’ve learned the tricks to navigating Sesame Street, you can enjoy it. Same spirit.
‘Trump’s victory will support His Highness the Crown Prince’s vision in the region for the benefit of all,’ one supporter remarked. ‘Even global companies, especially American ones, will play an active role in this renaissance.’
They’re confident that, despite Trump’s stated aim to disentangle the U.S. from Middle Eastern conflicts, he won’t hesitate to put pressure on Iran—an action that not only bolsters his stance in the region but also appeals domestically. This possibility thrills the Saudis. ‘Terrible news for Tehran,’ commented one analyst after the election results. ‘Expect a renewed maximum pressure campaign, sanctions against Tehran, and a higher likelihood of Israeli strikes within Iran against strategic sites, especially given Iran’s now-weakened air defences.’
What is the right framework to extrapolate this euphoria? How should we view the complex relationship—the push and pull, the reciprocal recrimination, the relentless race for narrative—between the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, and Iran? Is it a rivalry fuelled by proxy wars? Is it a rational, calculated power-balancing act, each side moving in step with perceived threats? Or does it hinge on ideology and sectarian divides?
The answer is all of the above. But understanding how it arrived here is most helpful.
Nasser
The Persian Gulf has been a battleground for three major wars since 1980, involving Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The dynamics between these nations require analysis before and after Iran’s 1979 Khomeini revolution. Before that turning point, the Arab Gulf States—particularly Saudi Arabia—and Iran viewed Egypt and its leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as a shared adversary. Nasser emerged as a hero of Arab nationalism, gaining admiration across the Arab street. This was a direct challenge to the regional balance of power in Riyadh and Tehran’s eyes.
So, they found common ground, albeit with minor friction over regional alliances like OPEC. But after the Khomeini revolution, Iran began to present a palpable threat to the Gulf States, appealing to Shi’a populations within these countries and positioning itself as the champion of Islam’s oppressed—something royal families in the Gulf found threatening.
Therefore, the revolution shattered the status quo, dealing a blow to Baathist Iraq and the Arab monarchies alike. From then on, relations between Iran and the Gulf States have remained tense, marked by critical shifts and unstable alliances.
Saddam
In 1980, Iraq, aiming to neutralize the threat posed by Iran’s revolution, invaded its neighbour. Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in this venture and invited U.S. military aid, which tipped the regional power balance in Riyadh’s favour. Following Khomeini’s death, under Rafsanjani’s presidency, Saudi-Iran relations improved. Both nations sought to restore diplomatic ties, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait further united them against a common enemy: Saddam Hussein, a disruptor of the status quo. For a brief time in the early 1990s, rapprochement seemed possible.
However, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan shifted priorities. Tensions resurfaced as both Iran and Saudi Arabia vied for influence in Central Asia.
Iraq’s downfall as a regional power following the U.S. invasion shook the Gulf’s power structure more. Now, in a bipolar Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran stood as adversaries locked in a high-stakes contest for influence.
The US
The U.S.’s role in the Persian Gulf remains a critical element in the Gulf-Iran relationship. With the British withdrawal in the 1970s, the U.S. stepped in as the new guarantor of regional stability. Although this dominance was briefly disrupted by the Iranian revolution and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it largely held until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that point, America’s approach in the Middle East shifted from maintaining order to reshaping politics.
Unsurprisingly, this reorientation impacted the power alignment in the Gulf. Iran perceives U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia as a direct threat, warranting its defensive posture against U.S.-backed Israel and the Gulf States. Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear program represents both a physical and ideological threat for the Gulf States. A classic security dilemma.
Discourse and sectarianism
Since the 1979 revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have both aspired to lead the Islamic world. Iran’s Supreme Leader claims the title of “commander of the affairs of the Muslims of the world,” while the Saudi King holds the title of “custodian of the two holy mosques.” During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran framed itself as the region’s sole defiance of U.S. hegemony, continuing its nuclear ambitions.
This kind of defiance threatens Gulf State regimes, particularly the Saudi monarchy. The Saudi clerical elite has responded with anti-Shi’a rhetoric, aiming to counter Iran’s influence.
Discourse and ideas can be as important as battleships and nukes in creating threats and acquiring power. Sometimes, it is the identity of Iranian and Saudi states and their shared realities that shape their perception of threats. Thus, the rivalry carries ideological weight and security implications. Since the early 1980s, Iran’s support for Shi’a groups in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s eastern provinces – the so-called axis of resistance - has annoyed the Gulf states the most. But in many cases, Saudi Arabia has exaggerated Iran’s influence over the Shi’a populations, lacking evidence to substantiate its fears.
The Arab Uprisings
The Arab uprisings unsettled the Gulf monarchies, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which feared Shi’a-led protests. In the Gulf region—from Saudi Arabia’s coast through Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE—Shi’a populations form a substantial portion of the populace, with significant political sway, as in Bahrain. The Shi’as in Bahrain took to the streets from 2011 to 2013, protesting the authoritarian rule and mistreatment by the Khalifa family. Saudi Arabia viewed these protests as Iranian meddling and intervened to suppress the dissent. However, economic disparities and government repression fuelled these uprisings, and a 2011 independent commission found no substantial evidence of Iranian interference.
Saudi intervention in Yemen since 2015 follows this pattern, too. The Houthis, adherents of Zaydi Shi’ism, have long faced political and economic marginalization and launched an insurgency against the government. Saudi Arabia viewed them as Iranian proxies – which they are -, but Iran’s involvement has, again, been minor. The Saudi intervention only worsened the instability, while Iran leveraged the Saudi perception of its influence. Problematic and irrational actions. On both sides.
Final word on the Iranian agency regarding the axis of resistance: Iran’s sway over its “axis of resistance” is there but has limits. Its foreign policy, for all its rhetoric, is driven by national interest.
No honourable Iranian would buy that!
With Abu Ivanka back in office, this power balance may tip even further in Saudi Arabia’s favour, pushing Iran into a defensive stance. This could lead to any number of developments. We’ll have to wait and see.
In the meantime, the best approach for U.S. and European policymakers, is to stop calling on the Iranian people to ‘wish’ for American or Israeli-engineered “liberation.” Such an approach is to grossly underestimate Iranian intellect and deep-rooted national pride. They may detest everything the Iranian regime stands for, but they would never welcome a foreign intervention to topple it.
As Christopher de Bellaigue aptly argues, such interference would backfire:
‘In the words of Ardeshir Amir Arjomand, one of the leaders of the 2009 protests, no honourable Iranian is obliged to choose between domestic tyranny and foreign intervention. Any incitement of a military attack on the country is a betrayal of Iran and its brace and wounded people. […] Most Iranians have lived under sanctions all their lives. Adversity is nothing new, and the majority, whether religious or not, are fiercely protective of their country.’
Fragments and findings
(This is a section for fragments of insight—serious, sometimes unexpected bits that caught my attention but don’t always fit neatly into larger narratives. This section will occasionally accompany the longer posts like this and sometimes—but rarely—will stand on its own. Consider it a mosaic of thought, a curation of pieces that, together, might provoke new questions or perspectives. Feel free to share your own ‘fragments’ in the comments—links are welcome!)
As I mentioned, it wasn’t only the Gulf states excited about Trump’s re-election. Here are two snippets from a panel of commentators on live TV at the right-wing, pro-Netanyahu Channel 14, doing what they believe is appropriate. A display of mandate psychology, perhaps? As we say in Turkish, “Bu kadarına da pes!”
The colonial imprint that keeps the Middle East in perpetual conflict, alongside the current war and genocide, has sparked a renewed gratitude in the Turkish psyche for the founder of modern Turkey, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After two decades of AKP rule—led by figures who once spent their youth cursing Atatürk’s legacy—he remains, perhaps now more than ever, Turkey’s only unifying symbol. His death was commemorated earlier this week. Erdoğan, who often blames Atatürk’s modernization reforms for the country's struggles, made an uncharacteristic remark at the 86th anniversary of his death: "If only Gazi had lived 10 years longer, we would have had a very different Turkey after WWII. We missed that opportunity.” As we say in Turkish: Good morning after supper, Mr. President.
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Ezgi Hanim, I will read whatever you write as I am one of your fans since your days back at Radikal (The more the better obviuosly). Best wishes.