Likelihood of Hezbollah's Demise After Nasrallah's Death?
There are differing perspectives on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in counterterrorism and insurgency strategies
On the morning of Saturday, September 28, the IDF announced it had killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an overnight strike on Beirut's Dahiya district, a Hezbollah stronghold in the Shia-dominated area. Witnesses, including seasoned reporters and analysts who covered the 2006 Lebanon war, described the explosion that levelled six apartments as, unlike anything they had ever seen before. Hezbollah members on-site kept the media at a distance, an unusual move for the group, fuelling speculation that Nasrallah’s body was buried beneath the rubble. Despite the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) and French intelligence reports, Hezbollah remained silent until later issuing a statement via their Telegram channel, confirming Nasrallah’s death. The question now is: what comes next? How will Iran respond? Let’s start with the basics:
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon, positioning itself as a resistance (muqawama) movement. The group quickly garnered significant support, particularly among Lebanon's Shi’a population and Palestinian factions. Iran, seeking to extend its Islamic revolution, viewed Hezbollah as a tool of statecraft and used the group to advance its regional interests, particularly through acts of terrorism aimed at imperialist powers like the United States and Israel. This alliance solidified Hezbollah’s position as a powerful, state-backed organization.
To reinforce the Shi’a axis stretching from Tehran to Beirut, Iran provides Hezbollah with substantial military, financial, and logistical support. This backing, facilitated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian banking systems, includes weapons and other military equipment, ensuring Hezbollah’s continued strength and influence in the region.
Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, which lasted over two decades, further entrenched Hezbollah’s mission and ideology, winning significant approval from the local Shi’a population. Until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, and again after the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah’s operations remained largely defensive, bolstered by strong regional support. However, its close alliance with Iran has increasingly strained relations with the Gulf States. Over time, internal divisions, its prolonged conflict with Israel, and involvement in the Syrian Civil War to support the Assad regime led to a significant decline in Hezbollah’s popularity, particularly within the broader Arab world.
Until October 7, Hezbollah appeared to favour a cold war with Israel, relying on deterrence and indirect conflict rather than direct engagement, a strategy that contrasts with the more direct approach typically employed by the IRGC-Qods Force. Everything changed drastically in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians.
Hezbollah launched attacks on Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians, as Israel pressed forward with its military campaign on Gaza. In retaliation, Israel has targeted Hezbollah nearly four times more frequently, with over 8,300 strikes along the 120 km border. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), between October 7 and September 20, there have been at least 10,214 clashes between Israel, Hezbollah, and other armed groups in Lebanon. Notably, around 81 percent of these incidents—8,313 attacks—were carried out by Israel, resulting in the deaths of at least 752 people in Lebanon. This information is crucial for understanding Israel’s broader strategy.
Why? Because what Israel is doing is not about the hostages. It is not about the displacement of 60,000 to 80,000 Israelis in the northern regions due to Hezbollah’s rocket fire.
It is seizing the ‘opportunity’ that some officials have claimed they’ve been waiting for years, going all out on every front.
Does leadership decapitation work?
There are differing perspectives on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in counterterrorism and insurgency strategies.
Jenna Jordan (Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark, 2014) argues that leadership decapitation—killing or capturing leaders of terrorist groups—is generally ineffective and can even backfire. She asserts that groups with strong bureaucratic structures and high levels of community support can withstand these strikes. Instead of weakening the group, decapitation may, in some cases, embolden them, boost recruitment, or spark retaliatory attacks, making them even stronger.
Patrick B. Johnston (Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 2012) in contrast, provides evidence supporting the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. His research, based on over 118 decapitation attempts across 90 insurgent campaigns, shows that targeting leaders can reduce militant violence and lower the frequency of attacks. Johnston argues that, under the right conditions, decapitation can have significant positive outcomes.
Kenneth Yeo Yaoren (Leadership Decapitation and the Impact on Terrorist Groups, 2019) offers a more nuanced view. His research highlights the mixed results of leadership decapitation, especially in religiously motivated groups. He points out that while decapitation can sometimes weaken or dismantle terrorist organizations, it often leads to increased violence, radicalization, and revenge-driven attacks. Religious and ideologically driven groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and others, tend to be more resilient after losing a leader. However, in cases where groups are more bureaucratic, such as Hezbollah following Imad Mughniyah’s assassination, decapitation can lead to decline.
Another study (Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism, 2012), conducted by Bryan C. Price, a U.S. Army officer, claims that he has briefed the CIA, the Secretary of Defense, and numerous military officials on the effectiveness of targeting terrorist leaders. "What I would usually tell them is, look, if you're asking how we should approach this, in my opinion, we should invest more resources early to decapitate terrorist leaders rather than wait," he explained. Using a large dataset of 207 terrorist groups from 1970 to 2008, Price argues that leadership decapitation is more likely to succeed when key factors are present—such as the leader's significance within the organization and the difficulty of succession. He notes that groups led by charismatic or ideologically driven leaders are especially vulnerable to collapse after losing their figurehead.
In a recent podcast, Price elaborated: ‘If you can target a terrorist group’s leader within the first year of its existence, you're 8.7 times more likely to see that group dissolve compared to a non-decapitated one. But here's the interesting part—the effect diminishes over time. At the 10-year mark, that advantage is halved, and by the 20-year mark, decapitating the leader becomes almost 95 percent inconclusive in determining whether the group's mortality rate will increase or decrease.’
Nasrallah is not the first Hezbollah secretary-general that Israel has killed, yet Hezbollah has endured for over two decades. So, in this case, the math doesn’t seem to help us much, does it?
Why many in Syria Celebrated Nasrallah's Death
BECAUSE: In Syria, Hezbollah, alongside the IRGC, has been crucial to the Assad regime's survival. Their control over key areas, particularly the Aleppo-Damascus highway—an essential artery connecting major routes—has provided Assad with significant leverage and military support. Hezbollah's role in Syria has also deepened Lebanon's internal divisions as well. By ignoring Lebanon’s non-intervention policy, Hezbollah has entangled the country in Syria’s sectarian conflict, exacerbating tensions at home.
Still, Hezbollah has gained valuable advantages from its involvement. Its operations in Syria have sharpened its urban warfare skills and provided combat experience to its younger fighters, preparing them for future confrontations with Israel. Moreover, by linking southern Lebanon with the Golan Heights, Hezbollah has expanded its operational reach and strengthened alliances with various Shi’a militant groups in the region through its collaboration with Syrian forces.