How does Erdogan/AKP plan to shape Syria’s future?
The AKP's interactions with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia's Ennahda—defined by a 'toolbox of tactics'—offer valuable insights into how it might engage with Syria's Islamist leadership.
Erdoğan longed for this moment—the moment of vindication. A moment ripe with opportunities: economic, political, and geostrategic. A moment when he and his team could attempt to craft a success story for an Islamist entity other than their own. He longed for Assad’s fall, hoping only that a group aligned with him and the AKP would succeed the Baath regime. But what he has now is more than he dared dream of just a few years ago. A Sunni Islamist leader, backed by Turkey and closely influenced by Erdoğan’s AKP, is poised to rule Syria. This marks the third time Erdoğan, and his party will attempt to be a model, to create a success story.
The first attempt was with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). The second, running parallel, was with Tunisia’s Ennahda. The Ikhwan trial spanned from 2011 to 2013. Interaction with Ennahda lasted longer, from 2011 to 2020. Now, Syria’s Jolani (Ahmad ash-Sharra) and his group HTS—or whatever name they may adopt—represent Erdoğan’s third experiment. Erdoğan has already hinted at this new endeavour.
Speaking aboard his plane after attending the D-8 Summit in Egypt, Erdoğa declared that ‘we will strive to assist them [Syrians] in shaping their state structure. We aim to share our experiences, exploring how they can be transferred to Syria and how a state can be rebuilt within the framework of a new social contract.’ He also highlighted the roles of National Intelligence Organization chief Ibrahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, noting their engagement with ‘all relevant parties from the beginning.’
Kalın and Fidan are no strangers to this type of mentorship. They were part of the core team that worked closely with Ikhwan and Ennahda. However, the AKP has changed significantly since 2011—and not for the better. Erdoğan has become more authoritarian, and the party structure more oligarchic. Many of the key figures who founded the AKP and shaped its intellectual foundation have defected. These were the individuals who spearheaded the mentorship process with Ikhwan and Ennahda. They provided the key components and contours of a model they believed could bring Islamist movements like Ikhwan and Ennahda success, drawing on their experience of establishing and maintaining power in Turkey.
Now, those figures are out of the picture. But Kalın and Fidan bring something else to the table: the experience of interacting with Ikhwan and Ennahda. They know what worked and, more importantly, what didn’t. This positions them to replicate—or adapt—a similar diffusion process between the AKP and Ahmad ash-Sharra’s HTS.
But what were the main components of that process?
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) and Tunisia’s Ennahda were eager to understand the factors behind the AKP’s success—or, as it was often called, the "Turkish model." This model was heavily promoted at the time by a diverse array of actors, including Western policymakers, think tanks, Turkish soft power institutions, Arab intellectuals, Islamist organizations (notably the late Qaradawi’s International Union of Muslim Scholars), and academics.
It’s hard to believe now, but in 2011, Turkey was still seen as the West’s preferred Muslim power. Its NATO membership, ongoing EU accession talks, and strong ties to European markets positioned it as a bridge between the Islamic world and the West. The AKP, with its Islamist roots, was regarded as a European-friendly actor, implementing a market-oriented economic program while being "authentically Muslim" enough to resonate in the Arab world.
This made the AKP model deeply appealing to both the Ikhwan and Ennahda. Their rationale was straightforward: if they could adopt similar strategies or policies, they too could gain legitimacy as effective political actors, capable of governing both domestically and internationally. In essence, they hoped to replicate the AKP’s success.
However, the Ikhwan and Ennahda also required technocratic and practical guidance. Despite being older movements, they lacked the professional experience of running a political party, let alone governing from a position of power. As one Ennahda member put it to me several years ago, the AKP was regarded as a "wow machine," and these two parties needed the tools to build a similar machine.
Two postulations can be made about the toolbox that the AKP provided to Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood between 2011 and 2013. First, it seems that what was diffused were not specific policies but rather selective tactics, carefully designed to be deployed during moments of crisis to strengthen the political standing of these movements. The emphasis was on fortifying their positions and equipping them to navigate the challenging circumstances they faced effectively.
Second, the tactics shared by the AKP were notably stripped of ideological content. This was not about invoking Islam as a mechanism for acquiring or maintaining power. Instead, the essence of the process cantered on normalization, legitimization, and crisis management. The approach was managerial, aimed at delivering pragmatic solutions to immediate problems. Complex ideological or social challenges were simplified into practical obstacles requiring methodical, step-by-step resolutions.
For a detailed examination of this toolbox of tactics and its implications, I encourage you to refer to my recent book, The New Spirit of Islamism: The Interaction between the AKP, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Would HTS want this kind of mentorship?
Oh yes. I believe HTS is actually better positioned for this kind of diffusion than Ikhwan or Ennahda were in 2011. While HTS’s radical posturing, violent past, and authoritarian tendencies in Idlib cast doubts about their willingness and capability to adopt AKP’s suggestions—such as building alliances across society, participating in elections, and becoming mainstream enough to win—there are also distinct advantages.
HTS does not carry the deep ideological fissures or entrenched factionalism that burdened Ikhwan. Ya’ni, they lack the baggage of past Shura councils or rivalries. Ahmad ash-Sharra’s pragmatism since 2015 demonstrates a willingness to adapt ideologically and strategically when necessary. Moreover, HTS has been in consistent contact with the AKP—through Hakan Fidan—for the past nine years. This sustained relationship must have fostered a critical foundation of trust and familiarity.
Another advantage lies in HTS’s proven ability to learn and adapt from external models. Reports indicate they studied the Ukrainian war closely, even receiving tactical training from a small group of Ukrainian fighters. More recently, a Syrian war expert affiliated with HTS, Yasser al-Jundi, revealed that their military academy in Idlib incorporates lessons not only from Ukraine but also from the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. This demonstrates an openness to studying and implementing successful strategies from other contexts.
There are early signs that HTS is already taking cues from the AKP’s advice. One notable example is Ahmad ash-Sharra’s symbolic decision to wear a tie, a subtle yet telling gesture of alignment with political decorum outside HTS’s traditional image. Another is Sharra’s inclusive remarks about Lebanon and the Druze community.
Perhaps most striking is his carefully crafted message regarding Saudi Arabia.
The AKP has a firm belief in Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2013 Egyptian coup, which ousted the Muslim Brotherhood government and imprisoned Mohammad Morsi. My research revealed that Hakan Fidan personally warned Morsi several times about the growing ties between Saudi forces and the Egyptian military. Against this backdrop, Sharra’s statement appears almost meticulously calculated. He expressed admiration for ‘the development in Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia’s bold plans and vision,’ and emphasized that Syria ‘will not be used to attack or destabilize any Arab or Gulf country.’ Furthermore, he credited the Syrian opposition with having ‘set the Iranian project in the region back by 40 years.’ The precision and sophistication of this statement suggest the involvement of a seasoned diplomatic team.
Despite these signs of readiness and willingness to learn, there are countless ways this interaction could fail.
HTS and Ahmad ash-Sharra might stumble or collapse entirely. A counter-revolution could emerge; remnants of the Baath regime are already networking in Beirut. And even if HTS adopts the AKP’s mentorship, there is no guarantee Syria will emerge as a democratic or prosperous state—Turkey itself, under the AKP, has fallen short of such ideals.
So don’t get wrong. My aim here is not to predict success or failure, but to provide insight into how the interaction between Erdoğan/AKP and Ahmad ash-Sharra/HTS might unfold. It is a complex, high-stakes process, and its outcome remains far from certain.